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Numbers in Regulatory Intermediation; Exploring the role of performance 






Much regulatory intermediation (RI) has come to entail forms of calculation and performance 
measurement. In this paper, we analyze the role of performance measurement in regulatory 
intermediation in a transnational multi-stakeholder setting where intermediation lacks an 
official mandate. We do this through a study of the Access to Medicine Index, which ranks 
pharmaceutical companies in terms of their access to medicine policies and practices in 
developing countries. We conceptualize multi-stakeholder intermediaries as “second order 
rule-makers” reconciling diverse and often competing implicit and explicit rules across the 
governance field. We then detail various intermediation roles of performance measurement 
between attaining input & output legitimacy and enticing compliance among targets. Our case 
demonstrates how the selective formalization of measurement processes, and the related ability 
to move back and forth from the role of intermediary to that of “ad hoc rule-maker”, are 
important conditions for achieving and maintaining legitimacy. Furthermore, it shows that in 
multi-stakeholder intermediaries that rely on performance measurement, compliance by targets 
depends on the uptake of performance information by powerful constituencies. This illustrates 
how addressing legitimacy concerns and enticing compliance through performance 
measurement should be examined as co-emerging processes. 
 
 
Keywords: regulatory intermediation, performance measurement, legitimacy, compliance, 
access to medicine  
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1. Introduction 
The shift from state led regulation to regulation by transnational communities comprising 
states, intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) and private organizations (Djelic & Quack 
2010) has seen the rise of a fast expanding set of roles and activities in global governance 
termed as regulatory intermediation (Abbott et al. 2017b). For a vast number of regulatory 
issues an ecosystem of intermediaries extend the reach and capabilities of regulators (Abbott 
et al. 2017b). These intermediaries can enable, facilitate and shape regulation by contributing 
to different underlying processes such as agenda-setting, negotiation, translation, adaptation 
and diffusion of rules, implementation, audit, monitoring and enforcement. Regulatory 
intermediaries often support the creation of the conditions for the “transparency” invited by 
regulators (Abbott & Snidal 2009; Garsten & De Montoya 2008) and, importantly, devise 
diverse types of “soft” pressure for compliance with the rules (Abbott et al. 2014). 
Intermediaries often compete for relevance in order to carve out a space for themselves 
in the transnational community they aim to associate with, and to sustain their positioning 
therein (Buthe 2010). Their legitimacy is usually seen to depend on pluralism and inclusiveness 
(input legitimacy), procedural fairness, transparency and impartiality (throughput or procedural 
legitimacy), and with the effectiveness and diffusion of the rules they seek to promote (output 
legitimacy) (Mayntz 2010; Mena & Palazzo 2012; Quack 2010; Tamm Hallström & Boström 
2010).  
Given the absence of “hard” sanctioning powers which characterizes non-state regulatory 
processes in transnational governance, the rules which intermediaries are involved in 
promoting frequently take the form of voluntary standards and best practices. The adoption of 
such standards and best practices by targets is usually achieved by means of reputational and 
competitive pressures, which intermediaries help exercise directly or indirectly, by enabling 
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others such as civil society organizations to mobilize those market-based compliance 
mechanisms (Bartley 2007; Overdevest 2010).  
These pressures for compliance are exercised through an increasing array of expert 
practices such as accounting, audit, certification, performance measurement, to name just a 
few. Such practices, some of which are the hallmark of professions such as accountancy while 
others remain weakly professionalized, are at the core of much regulatory intermediation. 
Related tools like performance indicators, ratings, rankings, indices, league tables, scorecards, 
social labels and the like (Espeland 2015; Merry et al. 2012; Rottenburg et al.  2015), are used 
by many intermediaries to evaluate and monitor regulatory targets and to incite them to move 
towards compliance.  
Performance measurement, in particular, has become a central feature of contemporary 
regulatory governance (Malito et al. 2018) and an increasingly widespread way of “knowing” 
and “judging” regulatory targets, both for the purposes of what counts in this context as rule-
making (e.g. defining standards and best practices by means of key performance indicators) 
and for the purposes of monitoring compliance (measuring the performance achieved for each 
indicator). Performance measurement and the production and use of indicators is not just a 
feature of nation states and their agencies, but underlies the entire expanding galaxy of 
regulatory governance, both nationally and transnationally. International governmental 
organizations (IGOs) such as World Bank or United Nations, non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs) and advocacy groups, monitoring bodies involved in the assessment and enforcement 
of standards, global business and investor groups, expert communities more broadly, have all 
become heavy users and producers of indicators (Davis et al. 2012; Malito et al. 2018; 
Rottenburg et al. 2015). In the case of transnational multi-stakeholder private governance 
initiatives such as the one studied here, compliance (via the transparency ostensibly achieved 
through performance measurement) and monitoring (via various types of assurance and audit 
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practices resting on the measurement of performance outcomes) are often achieved via 
intermediaries, typically NGOs, assurance and consulting firms, or expert groups (Fransen & 
LeBaron this issue; Mena et al. this issue).  
When mobilized as part of transnational multi-stakeholder initiatives, especially if 
stakeholders are divided, performance measurement and quantification can easily become 
vehicles of conflict as well as mechanisms through which closure to controversies is achieved 
in the name of the objectivity and rigor typically ascribed to numbers (Porter 1996). 
Performance metrics can be powerful ways of creating the relative consensus or “reasonable 
disagreement” (Mena & Palazzo 2012) that multi-stakeholder initiatives depend upon, yet the 
relationship between the use of metrics and the legitimacy of the regulatory processes they 
underpin, and its implications for compliance, remain far from settled.  
In this paper, we tackle such issues through the examination of a transnational multi-
stakeholder initiative based on performance measurement: a ranking within the pharmaceutical 
industry known as the Access to Medicine Index. This ranking, through 69 performance 
indicators, measures the extent to which twenty of the largest pharmaceutical companies in the 
world make their medicines accessible to patients in developing countries.  
We trace the work of the analysts who score companies for the purposes of this ranking, 
acting as intermediaries for the particular form of civil regulation (Vogel 2008) represented by 
this initiative. We discuss the formulation of indicators and ranking methodology based on 
consensus-building among stakeholders as a form of “second order rule-making” that attempts 
to reconcile various existing fragmented implicit and explicit rules. As we detail below, in this 
process of second order rule-making, contentious issues for which consensus is not achieved 
are transposed from the formal process of stakeholder consultation to the “unformalized” 
(Mena et al. this issue) backstage of company analysis and performance measurement. In this 
transposition, performance measurement and scoring practices which are attractive because 
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they are seen as technical, “cold” and insulated from stakeholder politics provide this multi-
stakeholder initiative with much needed legitimacy. However, performance measurement 
becomes in turn “heated up” by absorbing some residual unresolved conflict in the stakeholder 
base. 
In this way, analysts who act as intermediaries when monitoring company performance 
occasionally play the role of ad-hoc rule-makers when interpreting and reformulating scoring 
guidelines and measuring company performance. We thus identify a source of role 
hybridization for intermediaries (Havinga & Verbruggen 2017), which in our case is not so 
much a function of the specific relationships entertained in complex governance architectures 
(where a certain intermediary may be a regulator vis-a`-vis certain actors and a target vis-a`-
vis others), but descends from the need to manage conflict in contentious multi-stakeholder 
initiatives. 
Furthermore, our case shows that multi-stakeholder intermediation based on the periodic 
release of performance information about targets depends on the uptake and consumption of 
such information by powerful constituencies (influential Non-Governmental Organizations 
(NGOs), companies themselves, Intergovernmental Organizations (IGOs) such as the World 
Health Organization (WHO), and especially actual and prospective investors), so that those 
performance measures can attain regulatory power and motivate compliance among targets. 
Reliance on performance measures thus tends to make legitimacy (in terms of wide 
participation of those constituencies in producing and consuming performance information 
about targets) a continuing concern for multi-stakeholder intermediaries even after they 
become well-establised in the regulatory field. This ongoing importance of legitimacy as a 
precondition for compliance seems to differentiate multi-stakeholder intermediation based on 
performance measurement from other instances of transnational regulation (Botzem & 
Dobusch 2012; Mayntz 2010).  
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The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we position this study 
in the context of this special issue and review current debates on the relationship between 
different types of legitimacy and between legitimacy and compliance. We then discuss the 
relevance of performance measurement for regulatory intermediation, especially in the context 
of private multi-stakeholder initiatives. The following section illustrates our empirical site and 
data sources. In the subsequent empirical analysis, we focus on the performance measurement 
done by company analysts in their diverse intermediation roles as they produce the Access to 
Medicine Index. In the final section, we discuss performance measurement as a form of 
regulatory intermediation where measurement processes mediate the tension between the 
formal and informal side of intermediation, between input and output legitimacy, and between 
the needs of legitimacy and those of enticing compliance.  
2. Literature review 
2.3 Regulatory intermediation, legitimacy and compliance 
The scholarship on regulatory intermediaries has explored a diverse set of intermediary 
roles in regulatory fields, ranging from translation and adaptation of rules to coordination, and 
assistance with auditing and compliance (Abbott et al. 2017). Recent contributions to this 
literature have shown how regulatory roles are fluid and “chameleonic”, and that in different 
times and spaces the same organization can adopt different roles (Havinga & Verbruggen 
2017). Targets at times take on regulatory roles (e.g. corporations involved in governance 
schemes, in the spirit of the UN Global Compact) and intermediaries succeed in driving rule-
making agendas (Havinga & Verbruggen 2017; Van der Heijden 2017). Regulators, 
intermediaries and targets also engage in different processes of knowledge exchange and 
feedback, with various implications of such feedback for regulation (Auld & Renckens 2017). 
Given the lack of an official mandate that characterizes most regulation in transnational 
governance, the “legitimacy deficit” usually ascribed to transnational regulators (Menon & 
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Weatherill 2008; Scharpf 1999) may also be attributed to intermediaries. The relationship 
between the legitimacy of the “inputs” of regulatory work and how its effects and “outputs” 
are perceived, in particular, has recently received substantial attention (Mayntz 2010; Mena & 
Palazzo 2012; Quack 2010; Scharpf 1999; Tamm Hallström & Boström 2010). Input 
legitimacy in global governance relies primarily on democratic rituals of participation of 
concerned constituencies in the regulatory process (Mayntz 2010). Expertise is frequently 
mentioned as another source of input legitimacy (Mena & Palazzo 2012; Quack 2010). Output 
legitimacy, on the other hand, is related to the perceived effectiveness of regulation (Mayntz 
2010; Mena & Palazzo 2012; Scharpf 1999), a precondition for the diffusion and adoption of 
rules (Botzem & Dobusch 2012). Throughput or process legitimacy is seen to rest instead on 
the fairness, impartiality and transparency of the regulatory process. Input and throughput 
legitimacy are often collapsed (Botzem & Dobusch 2012; Mayntz 2010; Mena & Palazzo 
2012). Scharpf refers to them as “formal legitimacy”, whereas he describes output legitimacy 
as “substantive legitimacy” (1999). These two types of legitimacy are seen as related (Mayntz 
2010) and have been shown to be variously interdependent in cycles of rule formation and 
diffusion (Botzem & Dobusch 2012). 
Botzem and Dobusch examine the circular relation between input and output legitimacy. 
Their study of the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) illustrates how at an early 
stage of the standardization process, when standards were not yet fully formed and the 
standardization process was still controversial, great emphasis was placed on input legitimacy 
through stakeholder participation. This wide participation also meant that the standards being 
drafted were a collection of somewhat heterogeneous elements, which limited their perceived 
usefulness and thus output legitimacy. Over time, the vagueness and incomplete formalization 
of the standards allowed for gradual adjustments and modifications. These, coupled with the 
ability of the IASB to reduce participation and become an “expert-oriented standard setter” 
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(2012: 751) and with the support it received from a range of influential third parties, 
progressively led to greater output legitimacy, which the authors describe especially in terms 
of adoption and diffusion of the standards. 
Botzem and Dobusch conclude that input legitimacy at early stages can foster later 
diffusion and thus output legitimacy of the standards, but that over time output legitimacy tends 
to partly replace input legitimacy. In their analysis, input legitimacy may clash with output 
legitimacy (the initial heterogeneity of standards due to pluralism made them perceived as less 
useful), but can also increase the chances of later diffusion (by involving a large number of 
stakeholders and thus potential adopters in early stages). Input legitimacy concerns may also 
lead to rules (standards) becoming progressively more abstract and open to multiple 
interpretations. This limited formalization can be a condition for their wider acceptance and 
thus output legitimacy (see also Mena et al. this issue).  
Referring to Weber’s work on legitimacy, Mayntz (2010) further elaborates on the 
relationship between input and output legitimacy on the one hand and effectiveness of the 
regulatory regime and compliance by targets on the other. Referring mainly to the example of 
the national adoption of EU, GATT or WTO policies, she argues that legitimacy may not be 
essential for achieving compliance. Mayntz observes that compliance frequently depends on 
factors other than legitimacy, such as habit, interest calculations or fear of the reputational 
consequences of non-compliance. She argues that “[a]t least in the short run, little legitimacy 
is needed to uphold a regime, legal or not, that is able to reward and to punish” (p. 13)1.  
However, Mayntz is basing her discussion mainly on the example of official and long-
established IGOs such as the EU, GATT or WTO. The IASB discussed by Botzem & Dobusch 
is an instance of a private regulator whose initial standing vis-a`-vis the national states expected 
                                                 
1 Mayntz suggests that “It is the normative philosophical stance of political scientists that makes them enquire 
into legitimacy, rather than their empirical interest in the sources of compliance” (2010: 16). 
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to endorse its standards was quite fragile, and thus unlikely to be in the position to “reward and 
punish”. Given the diversity of regulators and intermediaries which characterizes 
contemporary governance, the question of the link between legitimacy and compliance, as 
Mayntz argues, is ultimately an empirical one.  
In their editorial for this special issue, Mena et. al. highlight two crucial aspects of 
regulatory intermediation in transnational governance: the presence or absence of an official 
mandate from a rule-maker and the degree of formalization of regulatory intermediation 
procedures. They argue that these two dimensions define the type of intermediation likely to 
emerge in private regulation initiatives, and that intermediation may change its characters and 
properties depending on how it evolves along the lines of such dimensions.  
Mena et al. argue that intermediation is to be seen as an emergent process which can 
develop in unexpected directions and whose unfolding needs to be analyzed beyond formal 
structural features such as the existence of an official mandate and the codified nature of the 
intermediation process. In particular, Mena et al. point to the cognitive and material dimension 
of intermediation – how tacit or implicit norms are progressively codified and inscribed in 
some material artefact such as a code, or else kept “unformalized” – as key to understanding 
how the meaning of rules is negotiated, stabilized or de-stabilized over time and across 
changing constituencies.  
Our study follows these lines of argument by examining the role of formalization in the 
interplay between input and output legitimacy, and between legitimacy and compliance. We 
analyze an “unofficial”, “beneficiary-related” (Monciardini & Conaldi this issue), “non-
delegated rule intermediary” (Marx et. al. 2017) in its efforts to construct for itself a 
“stakeholder mandate”. We detail how these efforts have been shaped by the development of 
performance indicators and scoring guidelines with different degrees of formalization, where 
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such guidelines provide a flexible mechanism to mediate between polarized stakeholder views 
while at the same optimizing the possibility of compliance by the targets.  
2.2 Regulatory intermediation and governance by indicators 
The rapid proliferation of indicators, rankings and ratings in the polity during the past 
few decades (Davis et al. 2012; Malito et al. 2018; Rottenburg et al. 2015) speaks of a 
calculative turn in regulation and governance. For example, a host of “regulatory rankings” 
(Mehrpouya & Samiolo 2016) now use performance measurement and benchmarking as a basis 
for understanding and promoting company compliance with stakeholder-defined standards and 
best practices: Access to Nutrition Index, Access to Seeds Index, Responsible Mining Index, 
Access to Vaccines Index, Corporate Human Rights Benchmark, and Access to Medicine Index 
(studied here). 
Governance by indicators, however, is far from uncontroversial or fully understood 
(Davis et al. 2012; Rottenburg et al. 2015). In broad terms, the use of quantification in 
governance speaks of the expanding cultural authority of accounting and quantification in the 
world polity (Drori et al. 2006; Meyer 1986; Jang 2006). Usually associated with transparency 
agendas, quantification and performance measurement can confer legitimacy to rule-makers 
and intermediaries because of their presumed scientificity and impersonality (Porter 1996). 
Quantification carries a promise of objectivity (Porter 1996) and thus democratization 
(Espeland & Stevens 1998), as well as being ostensibly portable and comparable on a large 
scale – the quintessential way of “governing at a distance” (Rose & Miller 1992), and thus 
particularly appealing in those transnational governance initiatives which seek to achieve 
transparency and comparability of global firms.  
Yet the processes of quantification and the underlying efforts to “govern by numbers” 
(Miller 2008; Rose 1991) in spaces of global governance are rarely transparent and have 
received relatively little academic attention compared to the empirical scale of the 
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phenomenon. As Rottenburg and Merry put it, the spread of quantification in governance raises 
questions concerning “the ways we set the norms we wish to follow, the technologies and 
instruments we regard as indispensable for organising collective life, and the role numeric 
representation should play in contemporary world orders” (2015: 1-2). How performance 
indicators are produced, validated and disseminated, and the enrolment of such “calculative 
knowledge” in various forms of regulation and regulatory instruments, are issues that require 
much more attention than granted so far (Malito et al. 2018). As Davis et al. (2012: 4) put it, 
the use of indicators “has the potential to alter the forms, the exercise, and perhaps even the 
distributions of power in certain spheres of global governance”; it opens a set of new questions: 
“How does the use of indicators in global governance change the nature of 
standard-setting and decision-making?,” “How does it affect the distribution of 
power between and among those who govern and those who are governed?,” “What 
is the nature of responses to the exercises of power through indicators, including 
forms of contestation and attempts to regulate the production or use of indicators?”  
 
Questions such as these have a bearing on our understanding of regulatory 
intermediation. In the space of transnational multi-stakeholder regulation, private regulators 
tend to use intermediaries to monitor compliance with standards and best practices, yet such 
monitoring inevitably requires to interpret and redefine (often through forms of quantification 
alongside qualification) such best practices and standards in the context of the individual 
circumstances of the organizations being monitored. Here the role of regulator and that of 
intermediary tend to blend, and quantification is at play in and mediates both roles.  
This blending of intermediation and regulation in the process of performance 
measurement allows much needed flexibility in the interpretation of actual and desired 
company performance, along two key dimensions. First, flexibility to set performance 
benchmarks that can be acceptable to different stakeholders (in our case, by combining relative 
and absolute benchmarks), thus supporting the management of a polarized stakeholder base 
and input legitimacy. Second, flexibility to adapt benchmarks in the light of observed company 
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behavior so as to maximize the possibility of compliance (by modifying scoring guidelines so 
as to highlight attainable performance improvements), thus contributing to the effectiveness of 
this initiative and output legitimacy. It is to such performance measurement processes as a form 
of regulatory intermediation in the contentious field of access to medicine that we now turn. 
3. Empirical setting: The Access to Medicine Index as regulatory intermediation 
Access to medicine in poor countries and communities, and its tension with commercial 
gains from the sales of medicines, is a centuries-old concern. Since 1994, the ratification of the 
Trade-Related aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) at the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) has forced all WTO member countries to create regulatory platforms and compliance 
mechanisms to protect intellectual property through patents. The TRIPS agreement implied 
that drugs and other products under patent could remain under the exclusive control of the 
patent holder for the period of the patent’s validity (typically 20 to 25 years). As a consequence, 
pharmaceutical companies began paying increasing attention to emerging markets (t Hoen et 
al. 2003). The TRIPS agreement is said to have caused significant price increases and decreased 
supply of patented products to emerging markets (Grace 2004). This has been concurrent with 
the emergence of HIV/AIDS as a key global health concern, especially in poor countries, which 
contributed to increase in the mobilization of civil society around access to medicines (Greene 
2011).  
Debates in this field are have tended to be highly conflictual, and litigation endemic 
(Morris 2010). Besides patents, other contentious issues include the pharmaceutical industry’s 
efforts in researching “neglected tropical diseases” which occur almost exclusively in poor 
countries (where pharmaceutical markets are frequently unviable), its role in providing 
affordable prices, and its marketing and lobbying ethics in low and medium-income countries.  
The WHO, as the primary transnational regulator in this area, has played a central role 
in providing the main regulatory infrastructure for the access to medicine field by defining need 
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priorities (in the form of the “Essential Drugs List”) and by publishing the global burden of 
diseases database (based on Disability-Adjusted Life Year lost to a disease), which quantifies 
the health burden of different diseases in countries across the world. The introduction of the 
United Nations Millennium Development Goals (MDG) in 2000 and of the Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDG) in 2015 have been further milestones in defining the access to 
medicine problem, and in delineating the role of the pharmaceutical companies in helping 
address this “gap” (WHO 2014)2. 
In this expanding transnational regulatory field, besides IGOs such as the WHO and 
the UN, other international and national organizations compete and/or collaborate towards 
adopting regulatory roles and orchestrating the regulatory field (Abbott et al. 2014). These 
include, as powerful funders, national development agencies – especially the Department for 
International Development (DFID) of the United Kingdom and USAID – and private 
foundations such as the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, the Clinton Foundation and the 
Wellcome Trust. In addition, NGOs such as Doctors Without Borders and Health Action 
International (HAI) are vocal in this field, seeking to diffuse their own narrative about the 
Access to Medicine problem and the role of the pharmaceutical industry therein. It is in this 
ecosystem of overlapping rule-makers that the Access to Medicine Foundation was launched 
in 2005. Its key regulatory product is a ranking known as the Access to Medicine Index. The 
first bi-annual index was launched in 2008 and the sixth iteration is under way at the time of 
writing. 
Each Index cycle of two years includes one year of stakeholder consultations aimed at 
updating the Index methodology, including an online survey, several stakeholder events and 
                                                 
2 MDG Target 8.E: In cooperation with pharmaceutical companies, provide access to affordable essential drugs 
in developing countries. SDG Goal 3: To achieve universal health coverage to include access to essential 
medicines and vaccines. 
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discussions about contentious issues at the “Expert Review Committee” (ERC), which includes 
representatives from each stakeholder group (see Appendix II).  
The latest iteration of the Index (2016) consists of 69 indicators, each accompanied by 
scoring guidelines to be used by analysts when measuring company performance. Each 
indicator is assigned a weight based on its perceived quality and correlation with the underlying 
goal of improving access to medicine. The indicators are classified under seven Technical 
Areas: 
• General Access to Medicine Management 
• Market Influence & Compliance 
• Research & Development 
• Pricing, Manufacturing & Distribution 
• Patents & Licensing 
• Capacity Building 
• Product Donations. 
 
[Enter Figure 1 about here] 
Indicators under each technical area are categorized in the four groups of commitments (policy 
statements), transparency (public disclosure/reporting), performance (output and outcome 
indicators) and innovation (unique in the sector initiatives) indicators. Following the 
finalization of the methodology and its release, a group of analysts engages in data collection, 
analysis, scoring and ranking.  
Since 2009, thanks to multi-year funding from the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, 
followed by UK Department for International Development (DFID) and the Dutch Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, the Index has become a central reference point for evaluating large companies’ 
policies and actions related to access to medicines. The Foundation’s (and the Index’s) success 
has been such that it is now a key source of knowledge for global debates in this area (e.g. by 
contributing to major policy documents issued by the WHO and the UN).  
4. Sources and materials 
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This study covers the development of the Access to Medicine Index from 2005 to 2016. 
Our sources comprise of documentary evidence, participant observation notes and interviews. 
Documentary evidence includes press releases, news and media articles, minutes of meetings 
and outputs from stakeholder consultations (such as online stakeholder surveys conducted in 
2009 and 2011, four stakeholder meetings held in 2009 and 2010, one meeting with NGOs in 
Nairobi, Kenya in 2010, two stakeholder meetings, two meetings with the pharmaceutical 
industry and two meetings with investors in 2011).  
One of the authors (name withheld for the blind review process) was a reviewer for Index 
2008 and later became the Index Project Manager, employed by the Access to Medicine 
Foundation’s subcontractor – Innovest (later MSCI) – from November 2009 to June 2011. 
From June 2011 up until November 2012 he was a member of the editorial board and steering 
committee for Index 2012. Since September 2012 he has been doing “participant observation” 
(Jorgensen 1989), taking notes of his engagements with the Foundation. 
We also conducted 24 semi-structured interviews, which were coded and transcribed. 
Interviewees included the Foundation’s founder, two of its former CEOs, two pharmaceutical 
company representatives, two NGO representatives, a UK Department for International 
Development (DFID - major funder of the Foundation) program manager, a WHO official 
involved in developing the Index since 2008, the chair of ERC for Index 2010 and 2012, two 
former managers of Innovest Strategic Value Advisors, the project managers for Index 2008, 
Index 2012, Index 2014 and Index 2016, the Foundation’s deputy director of strategy since 
2015 and members of the Index 2008, 2010, 2012, 2014 and 2016 analyst teams. 
5. Performance measurement, between legitimacy and compliance 
5.1 Input legitimacy 
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The Access to Medicine Foundation was launched in 2004 by Wim Leereveld, with the 
aim of enticing the pharmaceutical industry to do more for access to medicine. Leereveld 
describes his motivation to launch the Index along the following lines (Interview 2013): 
I realized I had a possibility to bring everyone at the table by organizing a sort of 
stakeholder consensus, a sort of common agenda – what the world wanted – and at 
the same time I knew the competitiveness of this world, of these companies. 
 
The agenda was to overcome the bitter confrontation between the industry and other 
organizations, such as some vocal NGOs, which had paralyzed the access to medicine debate. 
The Index was proposed as a measurement tool that could carve out, and operate within, a 
space of consensus. Discordant views on what the industry needs to do to improve access to 
medicine are seen as “problematic because the pharmaceutical industry lacks concrete guidance 
on how to best respond to societal pressure. Moreover, external stakeholders cannot hold the 
industry to account without using mutually-agreed-upon standards” (De Felice 2016).  
Operating with such an agenda in the conflict-ridden space of access to medicine was a 
daring enterprise for what was essentially, in its early stages, a one-man initiative – an NGO 
with only one full-time employee (its founder) which received its first major multi-year funding 
from the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation only in 2009. In its early days, the Foundation was 
a rather obscure “unofficial” intermediary (Mena et. al. this issue). It soon became clear to 
Leereveld, especially after receiving advice from a United Nations official, that in order to 
move the consensus-building agenda forward some formal stakeholder consultation had to be 
organized (Interview with Leereveld 2013). In 2006 and 2007, the Foundation and the company 
hired to develop the Index convened several stakeholder roundtables. The Foundation released 
a stakeholder consultation report and then an industry consultation report which served as bases 
for the development of the first Access to Medicine Index in 2008.  
Despite this first milestone, following the launch of Index 2008 the Foundation faced 
criticism both from the industry and some international NGOs with regards to its stakeholder 
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consultation process. In response to this criticism, for the following iteration of the Index 
(issued in 2010) the Foundation organized a stakeholder advisory body, named the Expert 
Review Committee, that was to oversee methodological development and decide on 
contentious issues. The stakeholders included representatives of the research-based 
pharmaceutical industry, the generics sector, investors, academia, Western and Southern 
governments, and IGOs – namely the WHO (Appendix II includes the ERC structure for Index 
2012).  
This was the start of the Foundation’s attempt to formalize a “second order rule-making” 
apparatus that would reconcile the competing and at times conflicting expectations and rules 
set for pharmaceutical companies by different constituencies (the “first order rule-makers”) 
into a set of consensual rules, in the guise of performance indicators. Company analysts3 would 
then focus on the intermediary role of collecting data and scoring companies with the combined 
goals of monitoring compliance and also enticing compliance through their scoring approach. 
At this early stage, stakeholder participation and consultation were considered essential to the 
Foundation’s survival and there was an intensification of efforts to achieve input legitimacy, 
focused on the formalization of a stakeholder mandate and on the informal management of 
stakeholder conflict.  
While the goal of the ERC was to define a space of stakeholder consensus that could 
provide the Index with a stakeholder mandate and compensate for its lack of an official 
mandate, achieving such consensus on contentious issues such as patents and competitive 
practices proved a continuing challenge. Examples of contentious indicators (especially 
contested by several large pharmaceutical firms) include those against data exclusivity (related 
to the exclusion of generics manufacturers from the use of clinical trial files of research-based 
                                                 
3 Company analysis was originally outsourced by the Foundation to firms like Innovest (later MSCI) and 
Sustainalytics, whilst from 2014 the Foundation has created its own in house analyst team. 
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firms), those against the patenting of medicines in the Least Developed Countries, and those 
endorsing Patent Pooling initiatives (such as UN Medicines Patent Pool). Methodological 
decisions on such indicators, when they could not be reached within the ERC, were often left 
to the Foundation and the analyst team. Such issues were moved, in other words, from the 
formal space of stakeholder consultation to the informal “backstage” of company analysis. In 
this way, analysts adopted an ad-hoc rule-setting role for those contested issues. The analysts 
tended to absorb the Foundation’s responsibility of dealing with and balancing the conflicting 
positions in rule-making that could not be decided in the stakeholder consultation process, and 
to produce scores that would reconcile those competing demands. This rendering technical of 
contentious issues helped weather the insoluble conflict that seemed to mark the space of access 
to medicine, and the “legitimacy deficit” which a small unofficial intermediary cast in this 
contentious space of immense economic and social stakes was bound to confront in its early 
days.  
The analysis process was formally described as avoiding any form of “politics”; analysts 
were told they had to operate as “experts” in evidence-based analysis and as politically neutral 
“stakeholder collectors”. This intense stakeholder intermediation work entailed at times an 
element of fear (Interview – Index 2010 analyst I):  
I mostly feared the companies, which is ironic because the Foundation was our 
client. I was more scared of the companies, because they know their data better 
than I do – way better than I ever could, but I depend on the data they send, as well 
as, obviously, external sources.  I had nightmares about making mistakes – but in 
a positive way, this forces you to make sure everything you’re putting in there is 
accurate [...] Hot topic areas – areas of dispute between NGOs and companies – 
were where I was the most scared of making mistakes, just in terms of legally 
representing them properly. 
 
In attempts to avoid politics and accusations of bias, projecting technical competence 
played a central role and quantification, in this respect, was paramount. Analysts considered 
quantified information to be more “dependable” (Index 2010 analyst III) or “scientific” 
(Interview - Index 2008 Project Manager). As specified by one analyst (Interview - Index 2010 
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analyst III) there was an implicit assumption that quantified data was more objective and 
reliable. Quantification, in other words, played a central role in the formalization of the index 
methodology and was seen as a way to increase its scientificity. 
For the purpose of data collection and scoring, the analysts relied on diverse sets of 
secondary sources ranging from the WHO (for DALYs, patents), Lexis Nexis (for lawsuits), 
Factiva (for news) and Thomson Reuters (for financial information). This was in addition to 
the information that companies provided in response to the Foundation’s questionnaire, which 
requested detailed information about their activities that could have implications for access to 
medicine for “Index Countries” and “Index Diseases” (the geographical and disease scope of 
the index).  
Not all sources were regarded as equal; analysts made a judgment of how credible each 
source was based on its level of potential bias. Analysts considered information coming from 
organizations universally regarded as credible such as the WHO as “the gold standard” 
(Interview – Index 2010 analyst II), whereas they did not necessarily consider local and more 
activist NGOs as neutral because of their more confrontational attitudes towards the industry. 
Overall the criterion for inclusion of sources was avoiding stakeholder politics when the issues 
at hand could not be made technical and addressed in an “evidence based” fashion. 
Intermediation, at this stage, meant the ability to screen all available sources on the access 
issues at hand, and ensuring that the sources selected remained scientifically valid, neutral or 
representative of the wide and often divided stakeholder base of the Index. 
This process of reverting to data accuracy and evidence was however not unproblematic. 
The expert views and scientific sources in many areas were also polarized. Ultimately, “it was 
about saying, okay, we have got some expert views, they seem to be polarized or inconclusive 
and we need to take a judgment call on the knowing that there are two quite valid perspectives”. 
(Interview – consultant for Index 2012). Alignment with the main views of, and with trends set 
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by, key international organizations was a way of securing and stabilizing the analysts’ position 
on contentious issues. In the words of the same interviewee: “what is reassuring I suppose is 
that the methodology review does seem to be in-line with global health trends I guess, thinking 
policy trends” (Interview – consultant for Index 2012). Thus, on the one hand contentious rule-
making issues had to be resolved in the not fully formalized space of analysts’ judgment, but 
on the other hand alignment with official and formalized policy documents provided this more 
subjective and informal processes with a safe anchor. Here, a subtle interplay between the 
formalized and the not-yet-formalized and between the official and the unofficial allowed 
analysts and the Foundation to maneuver between the conflicting poles of its stakeholder base. 
Over the years, stakeholder consultation seems to have become a “cooler” process. First, 
a range of technical sub-committees (TSC) were introduced with Index 2012 to support the 
methodology review process and insulate some of the technical issues at stake from the more 
open stakeholder politics of the ERC. Furthermore, with its increased stability and centrality in 
the field, the process of scoring companies and the language used by the Foundation more 
broadly have become much more assertive.  
Fear of politics, which permeated the analysis underlying the Index and the tone of Index 
report, has now been largely tamed. For example, the report for Index 2016 for the first time 
provides a summary of performance observed within each tier in the ranking, including a 
section for the lowest ranking companies, in which firms at the bottom are singled out (ATMI 
2016). In the early years, the Foundation tended to avoid focusing on the firms at the bottom 
because it could be seen as negativistic, as a choice of “stick” over “carrot”, where the former 
was deemed to be more “political”. Furthermore, the Foundation’s tone regarding the 
industry’s overall behavior has become more critical. From the language of “major 
improvements made” (ATMI 2012:16) in the past Indices, the Foundation can now frame the 
situation as “progress is slower than many of us would like” (ATMI 2016: 5).  
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This new confidence vis-a`-vis companies in the tone and methodology express the 
ability to move more freely from the constraints of input legitimacy which threatened the 
Foundation’s survival in its early days, especially with respect to one of its most important 
stakeholders, the companies, who are the targets of this regulatory initiative but also enablers 
as suppliers of company data. Nonetheless, the Foundation, despite its now quite stable 
positioning in the field, continues to maintain its stakeholder consultation infrastructure and its 
focus on good stakeholder relations. Additionally, it now organizes for each iteration of the 
Index, several meetings separately with the investors, the companies, the WHO and the local 
NGOs. Such continued focus on input legitimacy can be explained by the fact that, for the 
Foundation, the effectiveness of the Index and the compliance of companies depend on whether 
powerful stakeholders use it in their decision-making, so that pressure will be exercised on the 
targets. An inclusive stakeholder consultation process and good relations with stakeholders are 
important preconditions for their continued use of the Index in the governance space and thus 
fundamental preconditions for output legitimacy, to which we now turn. 
5.2 Output legitimacy 
Given the diverse and polarized stakeholder base for the Index, notions such as “output” 
or “effect” mean different things to different stakeholders. While in its communications with 
funders, NGOs, international organizations and Southern governments the Foundation 
emphasizes social impact, in its dealing with investors the Foundation primarily emphasizes 
the business case for access to medicine. The Foundation tends to present the business case for 
improving a company’s position in the ranking by suggesting that such positioning can be seen 
as a proxy for business success in emerging markets. This is while it normatively describes the 
provision of affordable, accessible and high quality medicines as part of the “social contract” 
of pharmaceutical companies (see for example the introductory letter to Index 2016: 5). Claims 
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of effectiveness have to reconcile different “substantive values” in the stakeholder base 
(Mayntz 2010), pointing to the mutual entanglement of input and output legitimacy. 
In the early days of the Foundation, there was little pressure for proof of impact. The 
main funders at the time were small NGOs (such as HiVOS, CordAID and Oxfam Novib) and 
their main emphasis was on matters related to input legitimacy such as inclusion and 
participation of stakeholders (Interview, chief executive of HiVOS, 2014). Since 2009, with 
the arrival of the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation followed by the UK DFID and the Dutch 
government, there has been an increased emphasis on providing proof of social impact.  
Similarly to other intermediaries (Kalfagianni & Pattberg 2014), the Foundation has 
encountered difficulties in linking its activities, arguably positioned at the “global level”, to 
improvements in the local realities of healthcare. Access to medicine in the 107 countries 
currently covered by the Index is affected by numerous factors – such as the local 
socioeconomic and regulatory situation or the provision of primary healthcare – over which 
the companies can exert little influence. Such contingencies mean that the industry, even when 
incentivised by the Index, can only play a partial role in improving “access to medicine”. 
Nonetheless, constituencies eager to monitor the effectiveness of the Index welcome evidence 
of indicative changes in the pharmaceutical companies. For example, in its 2013 annual review 
of the Foundation (based on the Logical Framework), DFID proposes that (DFID 2013): 
impact evaluation was not feasible and … a more upstream approach to showing 
the impacts of the Index needs to be taken … Positive behaviour change among 
companies is to be demonstrated through an independent evaluation, to be 
completed in 2015. 
 
This funder’s demand for an “upstream approach” is basically about giving up on 
evaluating effectiveness “downstream” on the target populations, resorting instead to finding 
“upstream” proxies for effectiveness. Along these lines the Foundation has sought to 
substantiate its effectiveness by engaging a consulting firm, Foundation Strategy Group (FSG), 
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to study stakeholder perspectives on the use and impact of the Index4. Responding to a survey 
of multi-stakeholder rankings titled “Rate the Raters”, the Foundation cites the FSG report 
where it states that the Index (SustainAbility, 2014, p. 2): 
provides useful guidance for some Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) 
departments as they seek to advance the access agenda internally, and it has 
influenced reporting – both in terms of the new level of transparency embodied by 
the Index, and in companies’ proactive communication of a broader range of access 
issues. 
 
Similarly, the Foundation actively communicates anecdotes linking the Index with company 
behavior. For example, in a Tweet in 2015, the Foundation highlights that: 
In line with #2014AtMIndex recommendation, #JNJ w. PHTI expands non-
enforce commitment 4 darunavir #patents http://ow.ly/MTkGB  
 
As to providing proof of the business case and financial impact of access to medicine 
targeted for investors, the Foundation collects evidence that large reputed investors make use 
of the information provided by the Index, such as analyst reports. Furthermore, the Foundation 
has compiled a letter signed by a large number of investors stating their belief in the financial 
materiality of access to medicine and committing to push for the Index’s agenda (ATMF 2016).  
These attempts to project at the same time social and financial impact have significant 
implications for the work of analysts. Company profiles published in the final Index report 
frequently emphasize both the social and the commercial implications of the companies’ access 
to medicine related policies and practices.  For instance, in an analyst training document for 
Index 2010, an example is provided for how the analysts should frame the implications of 
litigation cases: 
Such cases, if proven, can bring into question the effectiveness of the company’s 
reactions to the health hazards of its medications in the emerging markets. Such a 
weakness not only puts the target populations at risk but also can put at risk the 
company’s image and stakeholder relationships in the target communities. 
                                                 
4 The Foundation has also engaged Erasmus University in Rotterdam to set up an on-going impact assessment for 





Here, ineffectiveness in addressing health hazards is questioned in relation to both its 
detrimental effects on the target populations (social case) and also its implications for the 
company’s image and relationships with stakeholders (business case).  
However, developing indicators which promote the business case alongside the social 
one is not always possible. In the Index methodology, there are various indicators that place 
societal claims on companies. Some of these indicators can also be justified with a business 
case argument. One example are indicators related to research collaborations addressing 
emerging markets’ needs, where the latter have positive implications both for access to 
medicine (e.g. addressing neglected diseases) and for market expansion. Other indicators 
however are based purely on stakeholders’ demands with no, or even negative, economic 
implications for the firms. As an example, there is an indicator that gives a higher score to 
companies which do not push for protection of their clinical trial data from use by generics 
companies (termed as “data exclusivity”). This measure is based on the stance of the WHO and 
international NGOs on the issue and there is no strong business rationale for its inclusion. For 
most patent-related indicators the business rationale is also weak, as reflected in some 
comments made in response to a survey conducted by the Foundation in 2011.  
Attempts to attain output legitimacy in other words involved “values intermediation” by 
analysts aimed at appealing and providing proof of impact to constituencies with 
competing/conflicting value regimes. While the language used avoids claiming direct 
causality, efforts to provide both proof of social impact (primarily focused on funders) and 
proof of financial impact (targeting investors) have been intensifying as the Foundation and 
the governance field of access to medicine have “matured”. On the other hand, issues such as 
expertise, stakeholder inclusion and other dimensions of input legitimacy seem to have become 
less pressing and more taken for granted.  
5.3 Enticing compliance – Between competition, stakeholder accountability and learning 
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The Index operates principally through three “soft regulatory” processes: motivating 
competition among companies, enabling stakeholder accountability through transparency and 
promoting learning and diffusion of best practices by emphasizing and detailing “outstanding” 
companies and practices. 
Producing performance indicators inviting competition implies that analysts have to 
generate scores, rankings and sub-rankings (on different technical areas) that highlight 
attainable differences (and thus performance gaps) among companies. When variability in 
company performance for individual indicators is deemed insufficient, analysts refine the 
scoring guidelines for the indicator in question in order to be able to further differentiate among 
companies.  
Scoring guidelines enable and facilitate the measurement of company performance as 
articulated in the description of each indicator. They provide the benchmark for company 
compliance with the best practices the Index aims to disseminate. As data is collected, based 
on the observed levels of performance for each indicator, the scoring guidelines for each 
indicator can be adjusted to ensure a good distribution of scores for each indicator. Often, this 
means to make differences between performance levels subtler and more nuanced, by 
differentiating companies at the margin. These marginal differences point to attainable 
improvements in the performance of adjacent companies, maximizing the possibility of 
compliance and potentially contributing to the effectiveness of this initiative and thus to its 
output legitimacy. 
To maintain this flexibility in the scoring process, scoring guidelines are not disclosed at 
the time when the Index methodology report, which includes the updated indicators and scope 
of analysis for each Index, is published (before data collection). Scoring guidelines are instead 
published along with the final Index report, after being revised during the analysis process (we 
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have included a sample indicator accompanied by its scoring guidelines from the Index 2016 
final report in Appendix III).   
The Index started its life as a relative ranking, initially associating a score of five to best 
observed performance and a score of zero to the lowest observed one. However, this led to 
maximum and average scores in Index 2008 that some NGOs considered as too high and as a 
“too positive image of the industry”; the Index was accused of giving “a financial boost to the 
big brands and their socially conscious investors”, without any “real improvements in access 
to essential medicine in developing countries” (Reed 2008). Since Index 2010, the 
methodology has been revised to make it more demanding. Many indicators are now used as 
absolute rather than relative benchmarks; that is, they measure company performance vis-a`-
vis predefined stakeholder expectations rather than already observable best practices. A score 
of five is more and more often associated with best expected performance, effectively making 
the Index a mix of relative and absolute ranking. As a result, maximum and average scores 
have been progressively falling.  
This brings the index closer to being useful for stakeholder accountability, as NGOs and 
others aiming to put pressure on companies pointing to what remains to be achieved, can refer 
to the white space in the Index graphs (measuring the distance between overall company 
performance and a score of five) in order to put claims on any company and the industry as a 
whole. In other words, in combining relative and absolute ranking the Index methodology and 
the work of its analysts effectively mediate between the ability of the Index to work as a tool 
for competition and as a tool for advocacy and stakeholder accountability, also enhancing the 
flexibility of this multi-stakeholder initiative vis-a`-vis the needs of its various constituencies 
its ability to sustain input legitimacy over time. 
A third process the Foundation mobilized to achieve compliance was highlighting best 
practices and “star performers” to motivate a “race to the top” through mimicking and learning 
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by other companies (similar to Global Compact where learning is central to efforts directed at 
enticing compliance – see Ruggie (2001)). Compared to the aim of inducing competition, 
which demands a good distribution of scores, identifying “stars” and best practices requires 
making certain companies and/or practices stand out. The analysts were responsible to detail 
outstanding practices in each technical area. These were included separately at the end of each 
chapter of the report, and illustrated in narrative form. The Foundation further planned a related 
project to document and detail outstanding practices through a peer reviewed process to ensure 
their potential for improving access.  
The analysts’ attempts to obtain details about outstanding initiatives (such as sales 
volume for medicines, prices, performance targets, and market strategies) were however 
frequently challenged by companies’ reluctance to provide such detail, presumably because of 
the sensitive nature of some of this information and related confidentiality issues. In other 
words, while stakeholder accountability and learning through best practices require detailed 
public disclosure, the competitive dimension of the industry and related data confidentiality 
issues limit such public disclosure. The Foundation uses indicators focused on transparency to 
pressure companies to cede to public disclosure. Information disclosed to the Foundation 
without public disclosure is useful only for ranking purposes, supporting competition based on 
the ranking but not learning among the companies. Therefore, these two key compliance 
mechanisms – competition and learning from best practice – remained somewhat in tension. 
Intermediation, in this context, meant enticing disclosure and transparency by means of specific 
transparency indicators, while at the same time allowing for data protection in all those 
instances in which transparency was perceived by targets as a threat to the competitive game. 
Thus, all three compliance mechanisms at play were supported by the performance 
measurement work of analysts. These were at times complementary but also tended to partly 
 28 
conflict. Performance indicators were used to promote each of these mechanisms and to some 
extent allowed to mediate between them.  
6. Discussion 
The Access to Medicine Foundation provides an interesting example of an emergent 
“unofficial” intermediary (Mena et al. this issue) combining second order rule-making in the 
guise of stakeholder consultation and indicator design with regulatory intermediation through 
monitoring targets and enticing compliance by means of performance measurement and 
ranking. This initiative was launched without delegation or mandate from neither the 
regulator(s) nor the targets (Marx & Wouters 2017). It rose in a field rampant with conflict, 
wherein fragmented and polarized attempts at setting the rules for the pharmaceutical 
companies vis-à-vis the access to medicine problem were made on the one hand by various 
NGOs and Southern governments and on the other by the industry itself, with the WHO and 
United Nations promoting broader health policy standards and awareness of the problem. 
The intermediation studied here, with performance measurement and benchmarking as 
its cornerstones, is part and parcel of the broader trend of “trust in numbers” in public life 
(Porter 1996) as a basis for monitoring, audit and accountability (Garsten & De Montoya 2008; 
Power 1999). This reliance on transparency based on numbers organized in various devices 
such as indicators, ratings and rankings (Merry et al. 2012; Rottenburg et al. 2015) speaks of 
a calculative turn in regulation and governance, especially evident at the transnational level 
(Malito et al. 2018). Our case foregrounds several ways in which performance measurement 
can work as a form of regulatory intermediation, variously supporting a multi-stakeholder 
intermediary’s efforts to achieve and sustain input and output legitimacy and its attempts at 
enticing compliance among targets, detailed in table 1. (below) and in the remainder of this 
section. 
 [Please insert table 1. about here.] 
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6.1 Performance measurement, input legitimacy and formalization 
The Foundation’s extensive focus on input legitimacy through stakeholder consultation 
in the early years of the Index was aimed at establishing a stakeholder mandate based on a 
consensus that would in a way emulate the missing official mandate for its intermediation 
efforts.  The Foundation had to construct and maintain this somewhat fragile mandate through 
“officialization struggles” aimed at mediating between, and reconciling demands from, several 
powerful constituencies with more or less formalized claims on the pharmaceutical industry. 
Through its consensus-building work, the Foundation essentially engaged in “second order 
rule-making” to reconcile the fragmented rules different stakeholders would like to impose on 
the industry, and to come up with a consensual agenda or at least a “reasonable disagreement” 
(Mena & Palazzo 2012).  
This case shows that rule-making and intermediation can occur in layers and within 
multiple and complementary arenas. The WHO sets broad rules regarding the areas of access 
to medicine need and recommends broad health policies; the NGOs set rules more aligned with 
more specific societal expectations, aimed primarily at exercising public accountability 
pressures on companies; the industry sets its own self-regulatory norms and standards. In this 
context, the Foundation acts both as an intermediary and as a second order rule-maker trying 
to reconcile different implicit and explicit rules produced by others for the pharmaceutical 
industry. 
This composite picture points to the need to question the notion of rule-maker as a stable 
category in the R-I-T model (Abbott et al., 2017b; Abbott, Levi-Faur, & Snidal, 2017a). 
Especially in the context of multi-stakeholder regulatory processes (Fransen 2012; Mena & 
Palazzo 2012; Tamm Hallström & Boström 2010), focusing on processes of “officialization” 
rather than taking rule-making as given brings to fore the multiple and shifting locations where 
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the rules of the game emerge and take hold within the broad apparatus of regulatory 
governance. Intermediaries can negotiate their mandate with multiple more or less official rule-
makers (such as IGOs, NGOs, and even the targets themselves), each involved in producing 
more or less formalized rules. As the intermediary strengthens its mandate, rules can surface 
and “solidify”. Intermediation and rule-making thus emerge as mutually constitutive processes 
which become hard to disentangle empirically. Rule-makers, in turn, face their own 
officialization challenges, with their mandates shifting in content and strength. In the brave 
new world of regulatory capitalism (Levi-Faur 2005; Levi-Faur & Jordana 2005), in other 
words, the polity comprises of a pool of organizations with fragile mandates, mutually relying 
on each other’s rule making and intermediation roles to emulate the states’ public mandate and 
to stabilize their positioning. 
Input legitimacy has emerged in our case as a crucial part of such “officialization 
struggles”. It entailed establishing and sustaining the multi-stakeholder consultation processes, 
as found in the case of other informal intermediaries (Fransen 2012; Gulbrandsen 2008; Mena 
& Palazzo 2012; Tamm Hallström & Boström 2010). It also required a constant focus on 
political neutrality and to project the Foundation as a purely “technical” intermediary with no 
values of its own.  
However, the absence of consensus on contentious issues frequently led to transposing 
those unresolved issues to the informal or not-yet-formalized backstage of company analysis. 
In this way, analysts had to perform their formalized role as intermediaries, conducting analysis 
and scoring based on the rules ratified by the ERC, and to simultaneously engage in “ad hoc 
rule-making” for those contentious issues. This further illustrates how rule-making and 
regulatory intermediation are frequently intermingled. What we observe in the work of the 
analysts examined here is not only chameleonic shifts in roles (Havinga & Verbruggen 2017) 
which depend on the specific relationships entertained in complex governance architectures 
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(where a certain intermediary may be a regulator vis-a`-vis certain actors and a target vis-a`-
vis others). In contrast, our case points to a deeper, more fundamental and persistent integration 
and hybridization of those roles.  
The instability and incompleteness of the stakeholder “consensus” achieved within the 
ERC meant that concerns with input legitimacy were present at every step of the analysis 
process. As shown, especially in the early years, the significant power imbalance between the 
analyst teams of this informal intermediary and its powerful counterparts, added an element of 
fear to the work of some, further intensifying attempts to adhere to the principles of evidence, 
neutrality and objectivity. Quantified information was considered more reliable, replicable, 
objective and precise. However, as shown, while numbers were the formalized and 
foregrounded aspects of performance measurement, the challenges of measurement were 
mostly backgrounded and kept in the informal space of analysis. In addition, some 
methodological aspects such as the scoring guidelines were formalized and disclosed only at 
the end of each Index’s cycle, so that the intermediary could maintain flexibility in how it could 
score companies based on the possibilities and limits of the data received from them. 
Analysts had to balance between elements of their work that should and could be 
projected as solid, reliable and formal, and elements to be kept informal. This selective 
formalization allowed this unofficial intermediary to deal with contentious issues. 
Furthermore, this interplay between the formal and the informal and its timing were essential 
to maintain flexibility in the methodology development process and calibrate the Index as a 
regulatory tool.   
Several other studies have shown how ambiguity and lack of formalization are important 
to ease the adoption of standards (Rasche 2009; Thérien & Pouliot 2006) in contested policy 
fields (Best 2005). Our work further contributes to this line of scholarship by foregrounding 
the importance of attending to the dynamics of formalization (and, by extension, of 
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backgrounding what needs to be not (yet) formalized (see Mena et al. in this issue)) in the work 
of unofficial intermediaries operating in highly contentious fields of governance. Which parts 
of the intermediation process are formalized and when such formalization occurs is a constant 
process of backgrounding and foregrounding which is central to sustaining input and 
procedural legitimacy. Our case highlights how the formal and informal side of intermediaries’ 
work are not so much stages in a sequence which ends with full formalization, but rather 
constantly co-emerging processes supporting attempts to operationalize measurement 
conventions descending from a fragile stakeholder mandate. 
 
6.2 Performance measurement and the relation between input, output legitimacy and 
compliance 
Botzem and Dobusch (2012) point to the circularity of the relationship between input and 
output legitimacy. They discuss how input legitimacy (stakeholder participation to standard-
setting) can initially hamper output legitimacy (adoption of standards), but also how at later 
stages, as standards take hold, their adoption can be helped by the wide participation base of 
early stages. They also observe input legitimacy concerns progressively giving way to output 
legitimacy concerns.  
We identify similar dynamics in our case. As the Foundation becomes more established, 
its focus on output legitimacy increases and input legitimacy becomes progressively less 
problematic especially vis-a`-vis companies. However, unlike the IASB studied by Botzem & 
Dobusch, which moved from direct stakeholder participation to mere consultation, thus 
radically changing its basis for input legitimacy from a mix of democratic participation and 
expertise to pure (private sector) expertise, in our case stakeholder consultation exercises, and 
dedicated communications with powerful stakeholders such as investors, NGOs, Southern 
governments and the WHO have continued extensively, even if threats in terms of contestations 
from such actors have decreased over time.  
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For companies to care about the Index and to comply with the best practices it promotes, 
powerful constituencies need to utilize the Index in their decision making and advocacy work. 
Enforcement can only happen by means of third party pressures. Here stakeholders able to 
exercise pressure on companies become de-facto intermediaries, further pointing to the 
constant blurring or roles in the R-I-T model. As a result, stakeholders continue to matter to 
the Foundation as enablers of compliance. The adoption of the Index as a source of rules for 
the industry, in other words, can only be on-going and as a result the Foundation needs to reach 
out to stakeholders on a continuous basis. Conversely, in the case of the IASB studied by 
Botzem and Dobusch once IFRS are adopted by means of “hard law” endorsement, adoption 
can be said to have happened once and for all, or for the foreseeable future. In our case input 
legitimacy and output legitimacy appear to be linked at a fundamental level, as input legitimacy 
not only facilitates output legitimacy but becomes the key mechanism through which the latter 
is achieved. Intermediaries relying on the use of the knowledge they produce about targets by 
a wide set of constituencies to increase the possibility of compliance by targets cannot much 
reduce their input legitimacy efforts even when they are well-established in the field.   
Thus, our case raises an important point in response to Mayntz’ (2010) reflections on the 
relationship between legitimacy and compliance. Maytnz bases her argument of the 
overstatement of legitimacy as a condition for compliance on the analysis of European 
regulation, which is largely official. Our case illustrates the continued importance of input 
legitimacy in the absence of an official mandate in the case of multi-stakeholder regulation, 
when the compliance possibilities anticipated by the intermediary are maximized if 
stakeholders use the knowledge it produces about targets. We agree with Mayntz that 
compliance by companies may not fundamentally depend on the formal legitimacy of the 
intermediary, and that it may simply be a function of the extent to which companies feel 
threatened (e.g. in their reputation) by the actions of the intermediary. However, the type and 
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dynamics of the “mandate” an intermediary receives, as our case shows, will have 
consequences in terms of the path through which compliance is pursued, and the role of 
legitimacy in this, and need to be scrutinized. To be able to influence the targets, the 
intermediary we study can only work indirectly, via the the recognition and use of its 
performance information by other stakeholders, and thus legitimacy and compliance remain 
intimately linked.  
7. Concluding Remarks 
Our study of the Access to Medicine Index has helped us bring to the fore several aspects 
of unofficial intermediation based on performance measurement in a multi-stakeholder setting. 
By seeing this type of intermediation as a process of officialization in which “second order 
rule-making” by the intermediary contributes to building a stakeholder mandate, we have 
drawn attention to rule-making and intermediation as mutually constitutive processes, which 
are more widely distributed and pervasive than an exclusive focus on official forms of 
intermediation would allow to grasp.  
Secondly, we have highlighted the importance of the selective formalization of the 
performance measurement process for sustaining legitimacy and enticing compliance, where 
the latter remain more intimately connected than often posited by the literature. As discussed, 
this is because in our multi-stakeholder initiative based on performance measurement 
compliance heavily depends on the uptake and use of the performance information by powerful 
constituencies. Our case ultimately illustrates that addressing legitimacy concerns and 
developing the potential of rules, in our case best practices captured by performance indicators, 
for achieving compliance should be investigated as co-emerging processes.  
Finally, our focus on performance measurement is evocative of the role of material 
artefacts – such as written texts, hardware and software, graphs, scorecards, and the like – in 
regulatory intermediation, so far largely overlooked (Mena et al. this issue). Our illustration of 
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performance measurement as a form of regulatory intermediation, where marginal differences 
on the zero-five performance scale are used as levers for moving powerful global companies 
towards compliance, points to the need to trace these more mundane sites and mechanisms of 
regulatory intermediation beyond the role of human actors, attending to the technological side 
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Appendix 1 – List of interviewees 
Organization Position held Role at the Foundation 
Access to Medicine 
Foundation 
Founder and CEO 
Founded the Foundation in 2005 and since 
has been involved in various executive and 
chair positions at the Foundation 
Chief Operating Officer 
since 2011 
Supervised the production of Index 2012 
and 2014 and other operations of the 
Foundation 
Head of Research since 
2012 
In charge of managing analyst team and 
production of Index 2012 and 2014 
CEO from November 
2008 to December 2010 
Supervised Foundation operations during 
the development of Index 2010 
Deputy Director of 
Strategy – 2015 to 
present 
Involved in external facing and strategy 
setting at the Foundation. 
MSCI Group 
Analyst I for Index 2010 Were hired following the finalization of 
methodology for the analysis/ranking 
phase for Index 2010 – from November 
2009 to May 2010 
Each analyst was responsible for 
42nalyzing and scoring five companies and 
also to specialize in 1-2 technical areas to 
check the quality of the other analysts’ 
work in this areas.  
Analyst II for Index 2010 
Analyst III for Index 
2010 
Analyst IV for Index 
2010 
Senior analyst 
Headed the analyst team at MSCI for Index 
2012 
MSCI Group – 
Access to Medicine 
Foundation 
Former analyst at MSCI 
Group for ATMI 2012 – 
Analyst at the Foundation 
since 2012  
Analyst for Index 2012 and 2014 
Innovest Strategic 
Value Advisors (later 
acquired by MSCI 
Group) 
Senior analyst 
Project  manager and head of analyst team 
Index 2008 
Former CEO 
Involved in discussion leading to the 
development of Index 2008 and 2010 
Former research Director 
– 2011-2013 consultant 
at the Foundation  
Liaised with the Foundation and other 
stakeholders and supervised the 
development of Index 2008 – from 2010 to 
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NGO involved in funding of Index 2008 
and 2010 and present in stakeholder 





Consultant for the 
Foundation in 2012 and 
then Program Manager at 
DFID 
Consultant for  Index 2012 at Foundation 
in charge of leading the Foundation’s 
inhouse team and the write-up of the report  
-  in charge of managing 
relationship/reporting with the Foundation 
at DFID since 2013 
Novartis Head of Global Policy 
In charge of company response to Index 
data request and present in the 
Foundation’s company events. 
Merck Former Head of CSR  
Member of stakeholder roundtable for 




Coordinator – Medicines 
Information and 
Evidence for Policy Unit  
Member of ERC for Index 2008, 2010, 
2012 and 2014 – reviewer for Index 2010, 
2012 and 2014 
DFID Former economic adviser  
Member of ERC for Index 2008, 2010, 
2012 
Meteos 
Co-founder and partner – 
formerly SustainAbility  
Member of stakeholder roundtable for 





Appendix II – Expert Review Committee for Index 2016 
One representative for each of the following organizations: 
• World Health Organization (WHO) 
• International Federation of Pharmaceutical Associations (IFPMA) 
• The World Bank 
• Harvard Medical School 
• Community Health and Information Network (CHAIN) for Uganda 
• Indian Pharmaceutical Alliance  
• BNP Paribas Investment Partners  




Appendix III – Sample indicator followed by its scoring guidelines (Index 2016 final 
report p. 179) 
 
